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Abstract
This article deals with Soviet-Polish relations during the Second World War, which have for many
years, especially since the demise of the Soviet Union, been subject to revision and falsification.
Particular emphasis is placed on the period during the Second World War, when these relations
were of an ambiguous nature. The Poles never forgave the fact that on 17 September 1939 the
Red Army crossed the pre-war  border  and occupied the territory  of  Western  Belarus  and
Western Ukraine, forgetting that, firstly, these territories had been forcibly annexed by the II
Rzeczpospolita (Second Polish Republic) from Soviet Russia during the Civil War, and secondly,
that on that day the Polish government, including the Supreme Commander, abandoned the
country, the people and the army to the whims of fate and fled to Romania, where they were
interned. To replace this imprisoned government, a new Polish cabinet headed by General V.
Sikorski was formed in France. One of its first actions was to issue a decree in which it declared
itself in a state of war with the Soviet Union. In addition, it stated the nonrecognition of the
reunion of the Ukrainian SSR and Belorussian SSR areas of Western Ukraine and Belarus, and
declared its intention to fight for the return of these regions to Poland. It was under these
conditions of huge national tragedy that Sikorski's government took an anti-Soviet position.
Naturally, for the Polish government-in-exile (which after the defeat of France had moved to
London) to take such a position was not conducive to the establishment of normal relations with
the Soviet Union. In an effort to consolidate the forces of all the enemies of Nazi Germany, the
Soviet leadership considered it appropriate to bring the governments-in-exile into the existing
Soviet-Anglo-American coalition, and to push these governments to take an active role in the
struggle for liberation. Only after the Soviet Union's offensive defence had blocked Hitler's plan
of Blitzkrieg, thus proving its strength and ability to defeat the enemy, did Sikorski withdraw
from his divisive theory of "two enemies," the expression of which was the signing of the Polish-
Soviet  agreement  of  30  July  1941.  Sikorski's  official  visit  to  Russia  in  1941 was  of  great
importance in the establishment of these bilateral relations, and an analysis of this visit forms
the main content of this article.
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